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THE DOCTRINE OF CONTRACTUAL ABSOLUTION
MARCUS MOORE*
The absence of a knowledge requirement is a novel and astonishing feature of
unconscionability in Canada, and one that calls for scholarly reflection. In other
jurisdictions and formerly in Canada, unconscionability required that the benefiting party
knew or at least should have known that its counterpart was impaired in the making of the
contract. Such knowledge established a minimum level of wrongdoing, so that even without
more active exploitation, it was unconscionable as an “unconscientious abuse of power.”
But following the Supreme Court decision in Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller (2020),
Canadian contract law rejects this conventional approach. It does not require exploitation
to relieve improvidence by the vulnerable. It is argued here that this does not reflect the
notion of unconscionability, and is better understood rather as a novel doctrine of
contractual absolution. This article analyzes the important implications of this maverick
doctrine for the law, the market, and fundamental assumptions about the nature of
contractual obligation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of unconscionability has recently been reimagined by Canada’s highest court,
embracing novel features that depart from those which had traditionally characterized it as
well as related doctrines in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. Among these novel features
is the absence of a requirement that the defendant of the unconscionability claim knew or at
least should have known that the claimant was under an impairment in the making of the
contract (“knowledge requirement”). This innovation is of great significance to
unconscionability, to markets, and to long-held assumptions of contract law.
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The essential relevance of unconscionability’s knowledge requirement was not in the
knowledge itself. Rather, conventionally a knowledge requirement had been seen as a
minimum level of exploitive conduct, which unconscionability was concerned with. Thus,
even if no more active form of exploitation took place, for the defendant to conclude the
contract in circumstances that it knew or should have known that its counterpart was under
a disability was seen as an advantage-taking. In the language of unconscionability, it
represented an unconscientious abuse of power.
From that perspective, Canada’s reconception of unconscionability without a knowledge
requirement, following the decision in Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller,1 is an astonishing
development, and one which calls for scholarly reflection. This article investigates the
practical and theoretical significance of the elimination of unconscionability’s knowledge
requirement for the doctrine itself, for market participants, and for broader understandings
of contract law.
The discussion in the article proceeds as follows. Part II provides background on the
traditional doctrine and its knowledge requirement, and the context in which this key feature
of the doctrine was discarded. As well, it confirms the novelty of the doctrine’s
reconstruction with the knowledge requirement excised. Part III examines how this revision
of the doctrine produces results that from a conventional standpoint seem unjust. This
reinforces the view that the traditional doctrine’s inclusion of a knowledge requirement by
the defendant of the unconscionability claim, as a minimum threshold of blameworthy
conduct, was a condition needed in order to avert unjust results such as these.
Part IV then looks more closely at the practical significance of the knowledge
requirement’s elimination in conjunction with other associated changes to the doctrine made
concurrently as part of its reinvention. Of note, several of these changes operate to greatly
expand the doctrine’s scope of application, thereby increasing the significance in practice of
not having a knowledge requirement. Also, specific changes interact with elimination of the
knowledge requirement in ways that hold additional practical significance. These changes
include reducing to a minimum the doctrine’s procedural conditions, and correspondingly
maximizing judicial supervision of the substantive fairness of contracts. Some of the changes
also create special difficulties for use of standard form contracts, which could result in wider
economic disruption.
Part V examines the theoretical significance of the knowledge requirement’s repudiation.
Looking first at unconscionability itself, the investigation confirms that it is no longer
cognizable as resting on a basis of relieving exploitation. Instead, the new doctrine is
characterized by a one-sided focus on the position of the disadvantaged party and, in
particular, is concerned with relieving that party of the burden of a substantively improvident
bargain. It is argued that the doctrine as reconceived no longer embodies an idea of
unconscionability, but one of absolution — a remarkable new doctrine of Contractual
Absolution. The article concludes by considering the theoretical significance of this new
doctrine for contract law more broadly. There, it emerges as a challenge to conventionally
held fundamental understandings of the nature and effect of contracts.

1

2020 SCC 16 [Uber].
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II. UNCONSCIONABILITY WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE:
A NOVELTY
The Canadian doctrine of unconscionability traces itself directly to the English doctrine
of unconscionable bargains.2 It is one member of a family of doctrines found also in other
Commonwealth jurisdictions, each descended from the English unconscionable bargains
doctrine, and sharing broadly similar features.3
The traditional requirements of the Canadian doctrine of unconscionability have been
encapsulated in slightly varying ways.4 Factoring in the necessary clarifications and
explanations usually added to these, the elements may be restated more precisely as follows:
(1) one party suffered from a special impairment that seriously interfered with its decisional
autonomy in the making of the contract;5 (2) the other party knew or ought to have known
of this impairment in making the contract;6 and (3) the substance of the resulting contract was
manifestly disadvantageous to the disabled party and advantageous to the other party.7 These
features give effect to a conventional image of unconscionability as relieving exploitation:8
for the stronger party to conclude the contract in such circumstances was an improper
advantage-taking.9 The knowledge requirement represented a minimum level of exploitation
sufficient to trigger the doctrine,10 as it made the conduct “an unconscientious use of power
by a stronger party against a weaker.”11

2
3

4
5

6

7

8

9

10
11

Waters v Donnelly, [1884] OJ No 294 [Waters]; Morrison v Coast Finance Ltd, [1965] 55 DLR (2d) 710
at 713 [Morrison].
David Capper, “The Unconscionable Bargain in the Common Law World” (2010) 126 Law Q Rev 403;
Mitchell McInnes, The Canadian Law of Unjust Enrichment and Restitution (Markham, ON: LexisNexis
Canada, 2014) at 518.
Compare e.g. Morrison, supra note 2 at 713; Cain v Clarica Life Insurance Company, 2005 ABCA 437
at para 32 [Cain]; Downer v Pitcher, 2017 NLCA 13 at para 54 [Downer].
Stephen A Smith, Contract Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 343–44; McInnes, supra
note 3 at 524–28; John D McCamus, The Law of Contracts, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at 429;
Rick Bigwood, “Antipodean Reflections on the Canadian Unconscionability Doctrine” (2005) 84:2 Can
Bar Rev 171 at 182–87, 191–92, 199 [Bigwood, “Antipodean Reflections”]; Marcus Moore, “Why Does
Lord Denning’s Lead Balloon Intrigue Us Still? The Prospects of Finding a Unifying Principle for
Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionability” (2018) 134 Law Q Rev 257 at 273–76 [Moore,
“Denning’s Lead Balloon”]; Edwin Peel, Treitel: The Law of Contract, 14th ed (London: Thomson
Reuters, 2015) at 524; Downer, ibid at para 39; Earl of Aylesford v Morris, [1873] LR 8 Ch App 484
at 491 [Aylesford].
McInnes, ibid at 537, 544–48; McCamus, ibid at 431; Bigwood, ibid at 195; Moore, “Denning’s Lead
Balloon,” ibid at 273–74, 277–78; Morrison, supra note 2 at 714; Cain, supra note 4 at para 32; Waters,
supra note 2 at para 59; Downer, ibid at paras 44–49; Hart v O’Connor, [1985] UKPC 17 [Hart]; Earl
of Chesterfield v Janssen, [1751] 2 Ves Sen 125 at 155 [Chesterfield]; Aylesford, ibid at 490–91; Ayres
v Hazelgrove (9 February 1984), (QB (Eng)) [Ayres]; Charles Rickett, “Unconscionability and
Commercial Law” (2005) 24:1 UQLJ 73 at 78.
Cain, ibid; Morrison, ibid at 713; Fry v Lane, [1888] 40 Ch D 312 at 322 [Fry]; Mindy Chen-Wishart,
Contract Law, 6th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018) at 361; S Smith, supra note 5 at 342; JA
Manwaring, “Unconscionability: Contested Values, Competing Theories and Choice of Rule in Contract
Law” (1993) 25:2 Ottawa L Rev 235 at 262; McInnes, ibid at 528; McCamus, ibid at 426; Moore,
“Denning’s Lead Balloon,” ibid at 261; Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd, [1983]
1 WLR 87 (Ch D (Eng)) at 95 [Alec Lobb (HC)].
Bigwood, “Antipodean Reflections,” supra note 5; Rick Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003); McInnes, ibid at 525, 539; Chen-Wishart, ibid; Moore, “Denning’s Lead
Balloon,” ibid at 273–74, 276–78; Downer, supra note 4 at para 44.
Waters, supra note 2 at para 34; Morrison, supra note 2 at 713; Cain, supra note 4 at para 32; Dyck v
Manitoba Snowmobile Association, [1985] 1 SCR 589 at 593; John Cartwright, Unequal Bargaining:
A Study of Vitiating Factors in the Formation of Contracts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) at 214–20.
Supra note 6.
Morrison, supra note 2 at 713.
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As the above synopsis reveals, the Canadian doctrine of unconscionability traditionally
included a knowledge requirement on the part of the benefiting party. Virtually no support
can be found for the suggestion that knowledge in any form is not required.12 Beyond that,
for purposes of this article, it serves to accept the least strict view of what degree of
knowledge was required; this will help emphasize the significance of the requirement’s
elimination, even on the most dilute view of what knowledge was formerly required.
Following this approach, the knowledge need not have been actual; even constructive
knowledge would satisfy the knowledge requirement.13 Thus, in order for a contract to be
voidable for unconscionability, it had to have been the case that the stronger party was or
ought to have been aware of its counterpart’s impairment in deciding whether to enter the
contract. Meanwhile, the impairment in question had to rise to the level of representing a risk
of seriously interfering with the weaker party’s exercise of its autonomy in deciding to make
the contract.14 Examples of such impairments cited by leading traditional cases in Canada
include “ignorance, need or distress,”15 “ignorance of business, illiteracy, ignorance of the
language of the bargain, blindness, deafness, illness, senility, or similar disability.”16 Though
the impairment falls short of incapacity,17 in the circumstances it constitutes a defect in that
party’s consent, which was needed in order to validly form the contract.18 Because of this
vice in consent, the transaction is voidable.19
This knowledge requirement is among the features that traditionally the Canadian doctrine
shared with other doctrines of the same family, deriving from the English unconscionable
bargains doctrine.20
Unlike in various criminal offences, for example, the significance of the knowledge
requirement in unconscionability does not lie in the knowledge itself, as a separate
requirement from wrongful conduct.21 Rather, in unconscionability, the significance of the
knowledge requirement is that it constitutes a minimum level of wrongful conduct:
knowingly contracting with a party who was seriously impaired.22 The traditional doctrine
of unconscionability, and its siblings elsewhere, are conventionally seen as concerned with

12
13

14

15
16
17
18

19
20
21
22

McInnes, supra note 3 at 544. McInnes cites Marshall v Canada Permanent Trust Co, [1968] 69 DLR
(2d) 260 (Alta QB) as one of the few cases possibly suggesting otherwise.
Downer, supra note 4 at paras 46–49; McCamus, supra note 5 at 431; McInnes, ibid at 545, 548; ChenWishart, supra note 7 at 364; Moore, “Denning’s Lead Balloon,” supra note 5 at 274, 277; Ayres, supra
note 6; Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio, [1983] 46 ALR 402 (HCA) at 416–18 [Amadio];
Nichols v Jessup, [1986] 1 NZLR 226 (CA).
Bigwood, “Antipodean Reflections,” supra note 5 at 183–87, 194, 199–204; McInnes, ibid at 525–26;
Norberg v Wynrib, [1992] 2 SCR 226 at 248–50 [Norberg]; Morrison, supra note 2 at 713; ChenWishart, ibid at 361; Moore, “Denning’s Lead Balloon,” ibid at 273–74, 279; Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy,
[1975] 1 QB (CA) 326 at 339 [Bundy].
Morrison, ibid.
Cain, supra note 4 at para 32.
Bigwood, “Antipodean Reflections,” supra note 5 at 185; McInnes, supra note 3 at 526.
Ibid; supra note 14; Bigwood, ibid at 211–14; Moore, “Denning’s Lead Balloon,” supra note 5 at 283;
Cartwright, supra note 9; Jack Beatson, Andrew Burrows & John Cartwright, Anson’s Law of Contract,
31st ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020) at 374; Chen-Wishart, supra note 7 at 204.
Morrison, supra note 2 at 713; McCamus, supra note 5 at 439; Fry, supra note 7 at 322; Beatson,
Burrows & Cartwright, ibid at 399.
See notes 5–11.
Rickett, supra note 6 at 78.
McInnes, supra note 3 at 537; Bigwood, “Antipodean Reflections,” supra note 5 at 195; Moore,
“Denning’s Lead Balloon,” supra note 5 at 273–74, 277–78; Waters, supra note 2 at para 59; Downer,
supra note 4 at paras 44–49; Hart, supra note 6; Chesterfield, supra note 6 at 155; Aylesford, supra note
5 at 490–91; Ayres, supra note 6; Rickett, ibid at 78–80.
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relieving exploitation of the disabled party.23 As Mitchell McInnes encapsulates, “[t]he gist
of the doctrine is the exploitation of vulnerability.”24
It is true that the doctrines have been the subject of debate as to how wrongful the conduct
of the stronger party must be in order to constitute exploitation, as the concern animating the
doctrine.25 Put differently, there had been debate as to whether a form of exploitation more
active than knowledge was required, or again whether there was a requirement of wrongful
behaviour as distinct from knowledge.26 However, such debate did not go so far as to there
being wide dispute of the claim that there was at least a knowledge requirement. The
conventional view is that unconscionability required at least that the stronger party was or
should have been aware that the weaker party was under an impairment that posed a risk of
seriously interfering with the party’s ability to exercise its autonomy in the making of the
contract.27 If the stronger party had actual knowledge, its conduct was unconscientious in
wrongfully disregarding this knowledge of its contracting partner’s disability. If the stronger
party had only constructive knowledge, again it did not act conscientiously, as it wrongfully
did not take the reasonable steps called for in the circumstances that would have made it
aware of the impairment (and hence the need to have regard to it). A subject knows generally
that it is expected by law to act reasonably where the interests of others may be affected;
hence the party’s lack of more specific actual knowledge of the impairment is in that sense
its own fault; and that includes the consequence of the advantage taken of the impairment.
Representing in either case unconscientious conduct in a context of the other party’s
disability, the conduct is exploitive.
Separate doctrines seen as having some relation to unconscionability, such as duress,
undue influence, and incapacity, also generally include a knowledge requirement.28
But the traditional doctrine of unconscionability in Canada underwent significant change
in Uber.29 The controversy underlying this high profile case was whether gig economy
workers are employees or independent contractors for employment legislation. Uber is a
large multinational commercial enterprise whose software app lets passengers book rides
with registered drivers. The plaintiff started a class action representing Ontario drivers, suing
for $400 million in statutory benefits due employees.30 Uber asserted an arbitration
agreement, contained in its standard form contract with drivers, in order to refer the matter
to arbitration — which would effectively thwart a collective judgment.31 In the Supreme

23
24
25
26
27
28

29
30
31

See note 8.
McInnes, supra note 3 at 537 [emphasis in original].
Ibid at 537–43; Moore, “Denning’s Lead Balloon,” supra note 5 at 277.
Alluded to in Uber, supra note 1 at paras 84–85.
See note 22.
On duress, see Mindy Chen-Wishart, “In Defence of Unjust Factors: A Study of Rescission for Duress,
Fraud and Exploitation” (2000) 2 Oxford U Comparative L Forum; McCamus, supra note 5 at 400. On
undue influence, see Armin Hadjiani, “Duress and Undue Influence in English and German Contract
Law: A Comparative Study on Vitiating Factors in Common and Civil Law” (2002) Oxford U
Comparative L Forum; Bundy, supra note 14 at 341; Geffen v Goodman Estate, [1991] 2 SCR 353. On
incapacity, see Hugh Beale, ed, Chitty on Contracts, 33rd ed (London: Thomson Reuters, 2018) at 876;
Stephen M Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 7th ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2017) at 467
[Waddams, Law of Contracts]; Dunhill v Burgin, [2014] UKSC 18 at para 25.
Uber, supra note 1.
Ibid at para 188.
Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2013).
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Court of Canada, the drivers prevailed. Justices Abella and Rowe, along with five other
justices, found the arbitration agreement unconscionable. A concurring opinion by Justice
Brown would have ruled it unenforceable instead on the basis of public policy. Justice Côté,
dissenting, ruled it enforceable. Both Justice Brown and Justice Côté objected to the
majority’s use of, and approach to, the doctrine of unconscionability as inconsistent with
prior authority and scholarly understanding. Indeed, the judgment of the majority reimagined
the traditional doctrine with a number of novel features. Although enumerating and
appraising those is not the compass of this article, several are noted in Part IV below, insofar
as they are relevant to understanding the significance of the change of eliminating
unconscionability’s knowledge requirement. The innovation of foregoing a knowledge
requirement, as part of a reconceived doctrine of unconscionability, is the focus of this
article.
The doctrine’s traditional knowledge requirement was emphatically rejected by a sevenjustice majority of the Supreme Court.32 It should be acknowledged that it is apparent that
in arriving at this conclusion, the majority misconstrued the scholarly debate about whether
unconscionability required wrongdoing as meaning including knowledge, failing to
appreciate that the debate was about whether it required wrongdoing beyond knowledge.33
As well, the majority referenced Stephen Waddams, who uses the term “unconscionability”
to refer not just to the doctrine of that name, but “as a synonym for … unfairness.”34 Thus,
the majority may have conflated differing uses of the term, adding to its confusion. Certainly,
the majority gave the impression that in rejecting a knowledge requirement, it was endorsing
a position within an unsettled area of law, rather than reconstructing the doctrine’s
requirements from “whole cloth.”35
That said, it was also clear from the judgment of Justices Abella and Rowe that a
knowledge requirement was considered not only unnecessary, but inconsistent with their
vision of unconscionability.36 As articulated, that vision was focused on “protection of the
more vulnerable…. [A] weaker party, after all, is as disadvantaged by inadvertent
exploitation as by deliberate exploitation.”37
Justice Brown vigorously opposed the knowledge requirement’s elimination. Noting that
“unconscionability is generally viewed as requiring the stronger party to have at least
constructive knowledge of the weaker party’s vulnerability,”38 he argued that without this,
the doctrine is no longer intelligible as about exploitation at all. Instead, it amounted to a
“strict liability” conception of unconscionability.39 Alluding to the significance of
unconscionability’s reconstruction without a knowledge requirement, as this article explores,
he concluded that “[t]he wholesale shift in the law that my colleagues advance by removing

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Uber, supra note 1 at paras 84–85.
See notes 25–27. Admittedly, the terms of this debate are unnecessarily confusing.
Waddams, Law of Contracts, supra note 28 at 377.
Uber, supra note 1 at paras 84–85; Wastech Services Ltd v Greater Vancouver Sewerage and Drainage
District, 2021 SCC 7 at para 116.
Uber, ibid.
Ibid at para 85.
Ibid at para 164 [citations omitted].
Ibid at para 165.
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knowledge as a requirement … drastically expands the scope of unconscionability. It is
neither supported by the jurisprudence nor counselled by academic commentary.”40
As the latter statement suggests, and as the present section of this article confirms, a
preliminary reason the omission of a knowledge requirement is noteworthy is in breaking
from long-standing precedent that a knowledge element was among the necessary conditions
of the doctrine’s application. And relatedly, as also adverted to in this section, it is notable
in diverging from the Canadian doctrine’s sister doctrines elsewhere within the same family
derived from the English doctrine of unconscionable bargains.
However, the significance of the reimagining of the doctrine of unconscionability without
a knowledge requirement goes beyond merely departing from the traditional position in
Canada and current law in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. As the following section
shows, the revised doctrine seems to produce results that from a conventional perspective
seem unjust.
III. AN UNJUST RESPONSE TO THE SITUATION?
This is perhaps most apparent in contemplating situations in which the benefiting party
lacked even constructive knowledge — the minimum needed to satisfy a knowledge
requirement — that its counterpart was under an impairment that risked compromising its
ability to exercise its autonomy in the making of the contract.
Let us consider firstly a scenario in which the disadvantaged party, for its part, did have
at least constructive knowledge of this. For that party — thanks to the exclusion of a
knowledge requirement — to nonetheless be able to get a court to rescind the contract is a
striking result. And arguably, it is a result that is unjust. After all, this is a scenario in which,
by definition, the benefiting party could not be expected to know there was a problem,
whereas the disadvantaged party did know or ought to have known. Although operating
under a weakness, the party had the capacity to enter the contract, and therefore could be
held to it. Although impaired from freely deciding whether to join the contract, its capacity
along with its knowledge of the problem also enabled it to signal the problem to the other
party — in which case that party would have knowledge and hence reason to bear the risk
of the contract being rescinded in the event of a claim of unconscionability. Conversely, for
the party whose lack of even constructive knowledge of the problem gave it no ability to
have that fact inform its conduct, it seems unjust that it should reasonably rely on the
contract’s validity, and yet suffer detriment through the law allowing the disadvantaged party
to rescind the contract.
It is true that for an unconscionability claim to be made out, the substance of the contract
must also be unfair. However, unless a party has knowledge that its counterpart is under a
disability, it is normal and indeed perhaps appropriate according to the instrumental morality
of the market for a party to pursue its own advantage.41 It is also true that, even without

40
41

Ibid at para 167.
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 4th ed by Sálvio Marcelo
Soares (Amsterdam: MetaLibri, 2007), online: <www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/s/SmithA_WealthNations_p
.pdf>.
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knowing of its counterpart’s impairment, the stronger party in some cases might still obtain
a substantive benefit that goes beyond a reasonable exchange of value. If it were possible to
separate that which the stronger party receives as consideration for its own promises from
that which is the result of the impairment of its counterpart, there might be an unjust
enrichment to be restituted. However, given the practical difficulties of establishing
causation, and the principle that the law does not inquire into the adequacy of consideration,
this seems doubtful. More practically but no less controversially, the law could respond to
such scenarios by reducing, on account of the impairment, the substantively unfair
obligations.42 However, that would present concerns for party autonomy, private ordering,
and certainty, and I do not mean to suggest here that resolution: such a legal response would
itself be a significant change and a thorny proposition and would require evaluation in a
separate reflection. My point here is simply that it would at least represent a more qualified
and potentially commensurable response than a doctrine which makes the transaction
voidable.
But no such nuanced position is taken by the law as it stands after Uber’s hewing of
unconscionability’s traditional knowledge requirement. The weaker party can, as noted, enter
the contract with knowledge of its own impairment, thereby binding its counterpart, and yet
later get out, although the other party had no knowledge of the impairment and thus no
opportunity to prevent itself from suffering loss in reliance on the contract’s apparent
validity.
One wonders whether this might further create perverse incentives. For example, since the
stronger party cannot avoid application of the doctrine even where it could not be expected
to know of its counterpart’s impairment, it is in the interests of the counterpart to conceal its
impairment. Take for instance a situation like Aylesford, where a young aristocrat who was
heavily indebted agreed to an exorbitant interest rate loan.43 It is not hard to imagine a party
in a similar situation concealing their indebtedness, particularly if the debt is say from street
drugs or underground gambling, rather than a debt “on the books” that a lender can see. If
the law then favours a party who concealed a problem at the expense of another who could
not be expected to know of it, this would seem to add to the injustice of the doctrine’s
application without a knowledge requirement. Moreover, such concealment may increase the
number of contracts being made in problematic circumstances, as concealment will make it
difficult for the benefiting party to discover a problem, even by extra efforts. If there were
still a knowledge requirement, the party with the drug or gambling debts would have to
disclose them in order to be able to later avail of the doctrine, in which case the lender would
likely decline to conclude the contract — the sort of contract that in this case, as in many
cases of unconscionability, makes a bad situation worse.
Before moving on to consider the alternate overarching scenario in which neither party
had knowledge of the impairment, I note further that it seems likely that the current scenario
in which the weaker party did have knowledge is the scenario that would be more common.
As will be discussed in the next section, the doctrine as reconstructed not only let go of a
knowledge requirement but simultaneously underwent other alterations which greatly expand

42
43

This was the result for instance in Aylesford, supra note 5.
Ibid.
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its scope of application. These alterations include the doctrine’s extension to standard form
contracting in situations where the form-receiving party was uninformed about the terms.44
To begin with, then, it will be the case in all those situations that the form-recipient did have
knowledge of its position as what the doctrine, extended to this context, views as the weaker
party. And further, this party had knowledge that it did not familiarize itself with the terms,
as what the doctrine, extended to this context, views as that party’s impairment. Given that
standard form contracting is enormously prevalent as a mode of contracting,45 and very often
takes place under these conditions of the form-recipient being uninformed,46 the scenario that
the weaker party did have knowledge will be very common under the renovated and
expanded doctrine. Further, in contracts made rather through a traditional negotiation
process, one would also expect the party that unconscionability views as the weaker party
to frequently have knowledge of its impairment. As will be discussed in the next section, one
of the additional changes made to the doctrine was to dispense with using categories to assess
whether a situation qualifies for application of the doctrine, and instead cast the qualifying
circumstances in general terms simply as inequality of bargaining power. Nonetheless, that
principle had previously been recognized as underlying the accepted categories; and many
of those categories (necessity, distress, “ignorance of business, illiteracy, ignorance of the
language of the bargain, blindness, deafness, illness, senility, or similar disability,” and so
on47) describe circumstances which the party under the disability would be expected to know
of. Some of them, such as distress, ignorance of business, or “senility” are cast without
sufficient precision for the party to be expected to know whether its condition qualifies as
a disability. However, in at least some of those circumstances, the party will have had
knowledge of its impairment. All in all, given that the situations that unconscionability
covers fall short of incapacity,48 it will often be the case that the weaker party would be
expected to know of its impairment.
Although the scenario in which the weaker party did have knowledge of its impairment
may be more common, it is important to also consider the scenario in which it did not. That
is, this second scenario is one where neither party had knowledge of the weaker party’s
impairment. Where such a scenario does materialize, it may still be unjust for the contract
to be avoided as unconscionable. It is true once again that the substance of the contract must
be unfair for the doctrine to apply; and to be sure, the law should do what it can to protect
the vulnerable, by allowing them relief from unfair bargains they made under an impairment
that they were not expected to be conscious of. That said, the vulnerable party’s obligations
are to another private party that could not be expected to know of the vulnerability either, and
which itself was bound by its obligations to the vulnerable party. It therefore seems unjust
to overlook the reciprocity of that relationship, despite the flaw in it, by granting the
vulnerable party a mechanism to opt-out. Again, a more commensurate response would be
for the court to be able to adjust a substantively unfair obligation to compensate for the
impact of the impairment, and thus “cure” the flaw in the contract’s reciprocity. However,
such a response would obviously require a separate discussion of its own, on account of the
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several concerns it raises around party autonomy, private ordering, and certainty, as
mentioned earlier. But whether or not such a response is appropriate and practicable in light
of those other concerns, its relevance here is to help show that making the contract voidable
for unconscionability is by comparison not a commensurate response where the contract is
not the product of an unconscientious abuse of power.
It may be wondered whether difficulties in proving what the benefiting party knew would
effectively allow for parties under a disability to be induced into contracts through such
unconscientious abuse of power. However, this is addressed by allowing for constructive
knowledge, and is a reason why in my view, the knowledge requirement must include
constructive knowledge. The stronger party should be responsible for the consequences of
what it should have known. Regarding the concern about substantive unfairness, discussed
above, I hasten to add that if the substantive unfairness of the contract is pronounced, this
alone might be sufficient to say that the stronger party should have known that its counterpart
was impaired in some way. Thus, it is perhaps in cases where the substantive unfairness is
less significant that it seems most obviously unjust — in the absence of some sort of
procedural impropriety — to grant the weaker party an opt-out of a relationship that is not
just formally reciprocal, but substantively so, despite its imperfections. Without at least a
minimum justification for loss-shifting, it would be least unjust to let the loss lie where it
falls.
Of note, this view is also consistent with contract law’s general tendency to favour the
reasonable reliance of a second party over the volition of the first party. A party may have
been impaired in exercising its autonomy over deciding whether to enter the contract.
However, in the absence of even constructive knowledge of the impairment, it is reasonable
for the other party to assume that the consent it receives is valid.
In sum, even where neither party can be expected to know of the problem, it seems unjust
that the contract should be voidable for unconscionability. The discussion in this section
reinforces the view that the traditional doctrine’s incorporation of a knowledge requirement
represented a minimum element of wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant of the
unconscionability claim, which was needed in order to avert unjust results such as those
discussed above. As John McCamus wrote, “[i]t would be surprising … if a stronger party
who lacked knowledge of the inequality and whose behaviour was circumspect would
nonetheless be subject to a finding of unconscionability.”49 Yet, that is what the reformed
doctrine allows. Considering that the doctrine has traditionally been understood to avoid a
contract in order to relieve exploitation, it is unsurprising that it seems to produce unjust
results where it applies notwithstanding a lack of even the minimum wrongful conduct by
the defendant.
Summarizing common views underlying the traditional position of including a knowledge
requirement, Justice Brown explained in Uber that
equity’s interest in protecting those who are vulnerable must be balanced against the countervailing interests
of commercial certainty and transactional security…. Equity therefore demands an explanation as to why the
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defendant should suffer the consequences of the plaintiff’s vulnerability…. Requiring knowledge on the part
of the defendant makes it possible for both parties to know whether their agreement is enforceable at the time
50

of contracting and provides a compelling reason for holding the stronger party accountable.

For example, on Peter Birks’ view, the disadvantaged party’s impaired volition provides
a reason for restitution. However, since the party is not incapable, it is a relatively weak
reason. On its own, it is outweighed by considerations of stability of contract and market
certainty. Where the benefiting party knew of the impairment, and acted unconscientiously
by procuring the benefit anyway, is what would flip the scales and justify the contract’s
rescission.51
A similar position, expressed on more purely theoretical grounds, is reached by Rick
Bigwood. In his view, knowledge is necessary to establish exploitation, and exploitation is
necessary to connect the benefit obtained by the defendant of the unconscionability claim to
the disability of the plaintiff. From a corrective justice standpoint, there must be some
“causal” and “culpable” connection between these, arising from “the peculiar power relation
born of D’s known position of special advantage over P”:
To interfere with a transaction just because P did not [fully] “responsibly consent” on account of her special
disability, which disability might have been innocently unknown to D at the time, would be too “onesided”…. It would take no account of D’s own interest as an agent in freedom of action functioning within
the liberal institution of contract…. [A]ny court purporting to disturb an objectively concluded bargain
transaction on “justice” grounds cannot formulate appropriate criteria for interference … without taking the
expressions of human agency on both sides of the transaction fairly into account, justice by its nature being
a relational concept…. [W]hile the special disadvantage of P makes her vulnerable to a loss of effective
consent, it is the exploitation of that vulnerability by D that consummates the “non-consent,” and gives P a
52

legitimate “bilateral” justice claim against D for exculpation from an otherwise apparently valid transaction.

The unjust results of the doctrine’s application without a knowledge requirement in the
scenarios above confirm that the requirement was necessary in order to give at least
minimum effect to background concerns and considerations of justice such as those
described.
IV. PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE
LAW AND FOR THE MARKET
This section investigates the practical significance of the elimination of
unconscionability’s knowledge requirement, for the law and for the market. In assessing its
significance in these respects, it is important to take account of other changes to the doctrine
made in association with eliminating the knowledge requirement. These are covered below.
Part IV.A covers general changes which served to greatly expand the doctrine’s scope of
application. Part IV.B then examines how certain changes create special difficulties for the
use of standard form contracts.
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EXPANDED SCOPE OF APPLICATION
— AND THEREBY, SIGNIFICANCE

In conjunction with eliminating a knowledge requirement, other associated alterations to
the traditional doctrine of unconscionability have been made which serve to greatly expand
its scope of application. Indeed, it is quite apparently the intent of those changes to liberalize
the doctrine’s scope of application, and so enhance its significance in the field, as a
mechanism that can counter inequalities otherwise permitted by freedom of contract.53
Constraining inequality is a worthy goal. However, whether the actual measures taken are
helpful depends on whether they are the right choice of instrument.54 A general assessment
of that question must be left to discussion elsewhere. The particular focus of this article is
on the significance for the law of contracts of unconscionability shunning a knowledge
requirement — this being a novel and surprising stance.55 However, the role of other
associated alterations to the doctrine is in fact relevant to the discussion here in two related
ways. First, by expanding the scope of application of unconscionability these alterations
amplify the significance of the knowledge requirement’s elimination. The impact of the
knowledge requirement’s ejection will as a result be felt across a wider spectrum of market
transactions.56 Second, some of the other changes surveyed in this section interact with the
elimination of a knowledge requirement in ways that specifically increase its significance,
as we will see.
Looking now at these other associated changes, one of them was to dispense with a need
for the circumstances in which the contract was made to fall within (or be analogous to)
certain recognized categories.57 Examples of these categories, mentioned earlier, include
necessity, distress, “ignorance of business, illiteracy, ignorance of the language of the
bargain, blindness, deafness, illness, senility, or similar disability.”58 Under the reformulated
doctrine, the requisite circumstance is cast in general terms, as inequality of bargaining
power.59 Making the doctrine applicable not just in certain relatively defined situations, but
wherever a more general condition is satisfied expands the doctrine’s scope of application.
Indeed, this is the intent, as reflected in the majority’s statements that the categories “are
intended to assist in organizing and understanding prior cases of unconscionability” “but
inequality encompasses more than just those attributes.”60 The significance of that is to
increase the spectrum of transactions at risk of rescission for unconscionability despite the
benefiting party lacking even constructive knowledge that the transaction was made in a
circumstance which triggers the doctrine’s application. For instance, “[a]ny individual
wanting to borrow money from a bank, building society or other financial institution in order
to pay his liabilities or buy some property he urgently wants to acquire will have virtually
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no bargaining power.”61 These and other common circumstances of unknown inequality of
bargaining power may now be unconscionable.
The significance of this is heightened by the fact that the role of the qualifying
circumstances is to establish an element of “procedural unconscionability” required by the
doctrine in addition to the “substantive unconscionability” of the imbalanced contract itself.62
Traditionally, contracting in such circumstances was procedurally unconscionable in the
sense of constituting exploitation, considering the inequality and the stronger party’s
knowledge of the inequality, which was required.63 Under the reformulated doctrine, the
reason for retaining such an element is inapparent, as it is puzzling to describe as
“procedurally unconscionable” simply doing what a contracting party ordinarily does where
it is not expected to know that there was a reason not to.
Noted earlier was the fact that dropping the knowledge requirement may encourage
concealment of a disability by the party suffering from it. The other party’s difficulty in
discovering the existence of a circumstance that triggers application of unconscionability,
and that could result in the contract later being avoided, is exacerbated by the concomitant
change discussed here of replacing a finite list of recognized disabilities with a generalized
condition of inequality of bargaining power. It would no longer be even theoretically possible
for a party to ascertain whether unconscionability is a risk by investigating the listed
categories to see if any of them (or something analogous) applies; the limitless factors that
could result in an inequality of bargaining power would be impossible to canvass. For the
party whose reliance on the validity of the contract is upset by the contract’s later avoidance,
the less opportunity it had to do anything that could have prevented this, the more unjust
seems the result.
Moreover, while it is true that inequality of bargaining power is a principle that has been
seen as underlying the categories, in describing what the doctrine actually required, it was
traditionally qualified by modifiers such as “overwhelming” or “grievous.”64 The weaker
party had to be “seriously” constrained in the exercise of its decisional autonomy of whether
to conclude the contract.65 The inequality had to be of an unusual degree.66 But in replacing
the categories with a general principle, the qualifiers that made the principle one which
would occur more unusually have also been rejected, and the opposite stance taken, that
inequality of bargaining power simpliciter is enough.67 This further enlarges
unconscionability’s expansive new scope. Courts have sometimes observed that almost every
contract is made in conditions of some degree of inequality of bargaining power.68 If there
remained a knowledge requirement, it might not be as often that the stronger party should
know of the inequality of bargaining power, particularly if modest or minor. But without a
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knowledge requirement, if inequality of bargaining power is ubiquitous, the result is that
almost every contract might be “procedurally unconscionable”; almost every contract might
then be subject to avoidance based merely on a judge’s appraisal of its substantive fairness.
Of course, judicial statements that virtually every contract is made under inequality of
bargaining power could be exaggerations. If so, these consequences would be lessened —
but only to the extent of the exaggeration. Either way, stability of contract is greatly
diminished.
Other changes to unconscionability, made in conjunction with the knowledge
requirement’s extirpation, are relevant principally to standard form contracts. These expand
the doctrine’s scope of application still further — even beyond circumstances of inequality
of bargaining power, at least under that phrase’s traditional meaning for the doctrine.
Traditionally, consistent with the nature of the doctrine as an exception to the rule that
consent binds a party to a contract, and consistent with the extreme consequence of allowing
a transaction to be avoided, the sort of inequality of bargaining power contemplated was one
stemming from special circumstances.69 Or, as Stephen Smith puts it, the disability that
created the inequality of bargaining power had to be “peculiar” to the party or transaction.70
It did not cover common scenarios such as contracting by standard form where the formrecipient has not informed itself of the terms.71 Among the altered features of the reconceived
Canadian doctrine is that this does count as the inequality of bargaining power necessitated
by the doctrine, despite being a general phenomenon.72 The standard form contracting
process alone is not enough: as the Supreme Court said, “[w]e do not mean to suggest that
a standard form contract, by itself, establishes an inequality of bargaining power.”73 More
specifically, that inequality is considered to exist where the form-recipient is ignorant of the
terms. This is evident from it being noted that controls would not apply, for instance, where:
a sophisticated form-recipient was familiar with a form as common within an industry; or a
form-recipient received explanations or advice that “offset uncertainty” about the terms; or
the form “clearly and effectively communicate[d]” the meaning of surprising or onerous
clauses.74 As well, hope was expressed that this would “encourag[e] those drafting such
contracts to make them more accessible to the other party.”75 And in applying these
principles in Uber, there was a considerable focus on what the form-recipient “could not be
expected to appreciate.”76 In short, a form-recipient’s ignorance of the terms qualifies as the
disability required by the doctrine, despite being a typical rather than peculiar circumstance
in contracting by this prevalent method. This change thus extends the scope of the doctrine
to cover routine cases of standard form contracting, with the procedural unconscionability
element comprising the form-recipient being unfamiliar with the terms.77
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In this vast new field of application for the doctrine, what significance does eschewing a
knowledge requirement have? In standard form contracting, the drafting party typically does
not know whether or not a form-receiving party really knew and understood the terms. The
standard form contracting process often involves little or no party communication, other than
the form-recipient’s formal assent to the transaction, whose terms were preformulated,
standardized, offered to the world, and non-negotiable. Because a form is presented on a
take-or-leave basis, often in contexts in which the form-recipient has little real choice but to
take it (or take a similar form on the same basis from a competing firm),78 the assent by the
form-recipient does not necessarily mean it knew and understood the terms.79 Indeed, often
despite this formal manifestation of assent, form-recipients do not know and understand the
terms.80 Yet, as mentioned, the question of whether or not the form-recipient was familiar
with the terms is what under the new doctrine determines whether the procedural
unconscionability requirement is met.81
The law could require form-recipients to inform themselves before assenting,82 or require
drafters to verify that form-recipients really are informed of the terms, before the law treats
a standard form contract as validly made. However, such measures would undercut one of
the principal purposes of contracting by standard form: namely, for the parties to minimize
informational transaction costs.83 This aim includes avoiding a need for form-recipients to
inform themselves of the terms or for form-drafters to verify that a form-recipient knew and
understood what it consented to — both of which occur inherently where parties instead
contract by a classical negotiation process. Recognizing the modern economy’s need for
parties to be able to contract via standard forms, the courts have long treated standard form
contracts made under these low-information conditions as valid.84
For the reasons above, the drafter cannot be expected to know whether the form-recipient
in question really knew and understood the terms. Where the form-recipient did not inform
itself of the terms, a knowledge requirement on the drafter is what might still stand in the
way of concluding that the doctrine’s procedural unconscionability element is established in
all those cases. Because of the elimination of the knowledge requirement, there is nothing
left in the way of that conclusion. Hence, beyond all the cases of unremarkable inequality
of bargaining power in negotiated contracting as mentioned above, it will further be that in
routine cases of standard form contracting the contract is procedurally unconscionable. An
opinion that the contract itself is substantively unfair will then suffice for it to be rescinded.
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This may well be an aim of the reimagined doctrine.85 There is certainly a need for a
control of unfairness in standard form contracts in common law Canada.86 But there are
problems with doing it through this reconception of the traditional doctrine of
unconscionability. For one thing, the doctrine’s normal operation is to avoid the transaction.87
By contrast, in other places which have regulations addressing unfairness in standard form
contracts as at least a somewhat general issue, only particular terms are in jeopardy, while
the broader contract remains in force.88 Such regulations may be seen as including the
American doctrine of unconscionability, which, despite its shared use of the word
unconscionability, is not closely related to the Canadian doctrine or its siblings.89 Rather, the
American doctrine is based on US state legislation implementing UCC §2-302.90 Its normal
operation is to decline enforcement to an “unconscionable clause”; and only exceptionally,
where the unfairness of that term “permeate[s]” the contract as a whole, does it avoid the
transaction.91 For controlling fairness in standard form contracts, a term-specific modus
operandi would be essential, as avoiding a whole transaction is the sort of “all-or-nothing”
approach unhelpful in that context: it deprives the form-recipient of the exchange need it was
pursuing, and typically just leaves it having to accept a similarly shaped form from a rival
firm.92 Additionally, standard form contracts are seen as essential in modern society, and
therefore society would be disrupted by destabilizing such contracts as a whole.93
Another problem with the renovated doctrine being extended for use in controlling
fairness in standard form contracts is the question of what is served by the doctrine’s
procedural unconscionability element, which requires in this case that the form-recipient
have been unfamiliar with the terms? Elsewhere, controls of fairness in standard form
contracts (including the American unconscionability doctrine) are not conditioned on
whether the form-recipient was familiar with the terms. They apply whether or not the formrecipient informed themselves of the standard form terms.94 After all, form-recipients are said
to be “rationally ignorant” of the terms.95 As noted above, one of the purposes of this mode
of contracting is the efficiency-savings of being able to transact without knowing and
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negotiating every term.96 As well, even if a form-recipient did inform themselves of the
terms, it still lacks a “meaningful choice” over them, as a result of the terms being
preformulated and standardized to enable this method of contracting.97 The form terms are
seen as “dictated” by the drafting firm rather than consensually agreed.98 If there is
procedural unconscionability, it would be in the drafter’s knowledge that its unilateral
determination of the terms is without any mechanism to protect the interests of formrecipients, such as there is in traditional negotiated contracting through the bargaining
process. By contrast, for the reasons above, it is unclear why it should be procedurally
unconscionable for a form-recipient not to be familiar with the terms in standard form
contracting, that being part of the very logic of the practice.
Taking for granted the reimagined doctrine’s procedural focus, in the standard form
contracting context, on whether the form-recipient was informed, an argument could at least
be made that this really is unconscionable if the drafter was presumed to know that the formrecipient was not informed. A legal presumption would be more practical for controlling
fairness in standard form contracts, as it would obviate a need for onerous factual inquiries
as part of adjudication; on the other hand, it would be more difficult to reconcile with
concern about unconscientiousness in cases where, for instance, a drafter brought home the
terms to the form-recipient. A factual presumption would make for a less practical standard
form fairness control by leaving room in litigation for potentially onerous factual inquiries;
but it would better square with concern about whether conduct was conscientious as it would
allow, for example, the drafter to escape the doctrine by showing that it brought home the
content of the terms to the form-recipient.99 But as it is, the doctrine does not presume
knowledge (whether legally or factually) on the part of the drafter. As discussed throughout,
the doctrine as reimagined expressly disclaims a knowledge requirement at all.100 Thus, for
example, if a form-recipient intentionally misled the drafter into believing that the formrecipient had informed itself of the terms when it had not, it would still be able to invoke this
new vision of unconscionability, as the doctrine is not concerned with knowledge. Given the
above observations, it is unclear what it means to frame a form-recipient’s unfamiliarity with
the terms as procedural “unconscionability.”
The various dramatic liberalizations of the procedural conditions for unconscionability’s
application discussed in this section, affecting both standard form and negotiated contracts,
are accompanied by another concurrent change lowering the substantive threshold for a
finding of unconscionability. Traditionally in Canada, and still in other places where
doctrines exist of the same family of the English unconscionable bargains doctrine, the
degree of substantive unfairness required is typically high. In a similar way as with the
earlier-discussed procedural element, qualifiers such as “gross” or “substantial” are used to
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convey the need for a high threshold of substantive unfairness to be surpassed for the
doctrine to apply.101 But in the doctrine as reconstructed, this has been rejected as well. The
opposite stance is endorsed: that an elevated threshold is inappropriate; unfairness simpliciter
is enough.102 As with the other changes discussed in this section, this renovation of the
doctrine vastly expands its scope of application. Many more contracts exceed this lower level
of unfairness than the traditional high bar. Many more contracts are thus at risk of being
avoided for unconscionability without the party wishing to uphold the contract having had
even constructive knowledge of any flaw in its formation.
As well, because fairness is an assessment that is quite subjective and oft-contested,103 it
will be difficult to achieve consistency in adjudicating it to the fine degree entailed by a low
standard.104 Yet, whether or not a contract is unconscionable and subject to rescission turns
on this. This unpredictability places the party who would wish to uphold the contract in a
difficult predicament.
Consider firstly standard form contracts. Accepting the form-recipient’s ignorance of the
terms as a qualifying disability, and rejecting a knowledge requirement by the drafter, means,
as discussed above, that many standard forms will be voidable based on an assessment of
their substantive fairness. Using a low bar of unfairness, the unpredictability of the
assessment makes it difficult to draft a standard form not at risk of rescission. As part of this
redrawing of unconscionability, it was perhaps assumed that form-drafters could and should
achieve the predictability they need by taking it upon themselves to err on the side of fairness
toward form-recipients. But from a business perspective, this does not seem realistic. It might
be feasible in portions of a standard form contract in which the parties have a common
interest, or even portions in which at least they do not have an adverse interest. However, in
portions in which the parties have opposing interests, for the firm to draft terms erring on the
side of fairness to the other side will directly detract from its own business interests. Caution
with respect to liability risks then becomes recklessness with respect to business risks. Under
a low threshold of unfairness, it is not obvious how a drafter could readily mitigate these
countervailing risks.
Now consider contracts made through a classical negotiation process. Without a
requirement of even constructive knowledge, the stronger party lacks reason to know that it
is strong and its counterpart weak. As a result, the party would be expected to pursue
negotiations in the usual way, pushing its interests through the bargaining process, and
counting on its counterpart to look to its own interests. But as a result of inferior bargaining
by the impaired counterpart, the result is likely to be a bargain whose substance is at risk of
being appraised as unfair. The contract will then be voidable for unconscionability.
Conversely, if a party, not knowing whether it might be the stronger party, holds back in
favour of the interests of its counterpart in areas where the parties’ interests conflict, this will
detract from its own business interests. Hence, for negotiated contracts also, the party who
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would wish to uphold the contract faces, due to the lowered standard of unfairness, a difficult
and perhaps intractable predicament of significant countervailing risks.
In sum, looking at the elimination of the knowledge requirement in the context of the
associated other changes made concurrently with it, as surveyed in this section, reveals
dimensions of larger significance. One aspect of this flows from the changes’ tremendous
expansion of the doctrine’s scope of application: it means that many contracts across the
market are now at risk of rescission for unconscionability, despite the benefiting party not
being expected to know there was any issue with their formation. In this context, the meaning
of the doctrine’s “procedural unconscionability” element is unclear, as is its purpose. Marked
liberalization of this requirement — supported by the lack of any knowledge requirement of
the relevant procedural circumstances — makes the reconstructed unconscionability doctrine
one preoccupied with substantive fairness. As these changes have been accompanied also by
a lowering of the bar of substantive unfairness that qualifies as unconscionable, parties
hoping to benefit from contracts and needing to conduct wider business planning in reliance
on contractual stability will encounter difficulties under the revised doctrine.
B.

SPECIAL DIFFICULTIES FOR
STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS

The impacts examined in the preceding section of eliminating unconscionability’s
knowledge requirement in the context of other associated changes concurrently made to the
doctrine were ones that pertained to contracting by any mode. Additional significant impacts
apply specially to standard form contracting. Given the predominance of this mode of
contracting in contemporary society,105 this section investigates these further issues.
A change discussed in the last section was how the procedural unconscionability condition
can now be established when contracting by standard form, based solely on whether the
form-recipient was uninformed of the terms, without a knowledge requirement on the drafter.
As this is often the case, all such contracts are now potentially voidable based on a judicial
assessment of their substantive unfairness. This effectively creates a collateral change that
impacts standard form contracts, to be considered here: the use of a generalized procedural
criterion in place of the traditional party-or-transaction-specific criteria, along with the
remaining focus on the substantive fairness of a standardized contract, brings the doctrine
into close alignment with the criteria for certification of class actions. Class actions are
considered inappropriate where there are particular issues, and appropriate where there are
common issues across the class.106 As a result, it will now be much easier to pursue a class
action for unconscionability on behalf of recipients of a given form. This means that for
standard form contracts in which the form-recipients are typically unfamiliar with the terms,
it will not just be the contract with a given form-recipient at risk of being found
unconscionable, but all instances of the same standard contract used across the market.
Elsewhere, in regulations which address unfairness in standard form contracts, collective
recourses are important in helping deal efficiently with unfairness that is not individualized
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but market-wide.107 However, as noted in the preceding section, such regulation only
jeopardizes particular terms viewed as unfair, leaving the rest of the contract intact. By
contrast, the doctrine of unconscionability, as a vice of consent which was needed to validly
form the contract, normally operates to avoid the whole transaction.108 This is unhelpful in
controlling fairness in standard form contracts.109 Meanwhile, the mass avoidance of a
standard form contract across all its instances market-wide may be quite destabilizing. In this
way, the reimagined doctrine’s impact of destabilizing contractual relations is multiplied
exponentially as applied to standard form contracts.
In fact, the economic destabilization may be wider still: it is not uncommon for rival firms
within an industry to employ similar forms.110 A finding of unconscionability could then
effectively unravel a whole transaction-type. Further, because standard form contracts tend
to form part of a network of contracts that in practice construct governance arrangements for
an industry, including relationships with external but associated industries, their avoidance
for unconscionability risks broad economic disruption.111
What means do form-drafters have of mitigating this risk? If the forms are substantively
fair, they would not be unconscionable. However, another of the associated changes
discussed in the last section was that the threshold of unfairness required for
unconscionability is lowered under the renovated doctrine. Given the subjectivity and
contestability of assessments of substantive fairness, this made for an unpredictable standard
that complicated the task of drafting. If a drafter erred on the side of fairness to formrecipients, wherever the parties’ interests are opposed, this would damage its own business
interests. In the context of standard form contracts, the business impact of this is again
something that will be multiplied contract-by-contract across all instances of the same
standard form’s use on the scale of the firm’s market. This could be perilous, even for large
multinational corporations.112 And not every business is big and wealthy; notably, small
business also depends on standard form contracts.
Going that route will be all the more perilous for the business in that a firm invests in
drafting a form and chances a take-or-leave posture on its acceptance in transaction-types
where the costs of this approach are exceeded by a special interest it has in adhering to its
terms as standards for that transaction-type.113 As a result, the transaction-types for which a
firm drafts and relies on its standard form are those in which it is least likely to be able to
afford liberality. Such transactions will obviously also be ones in which the countervailing
risk of their rescission en masse for unconscionability will be especially damaging.
As well, the reconception of the doctrine may include another change which could
effectively lower the threshold of unfairness required for unconscionability specifically for
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standard form contracts. That is, beyond the lower standard of unfairness simpliciter versus
gross unfairness already discussed, there was some suggestion it could be enough if even a
single standard form term within the contract is unfair.114 Thus, the contract as a whole might
be fair, but if there is a particular term within it that is unfair, this might suffice for a finding
of unconscionability under the renovated doctrine. This was the result, for instance, in Uber:
it was the employment contract’s arbitration clause that was alleged to be unfair and that was
the basis of the finding of unconscionability.
In that instance, only the term was invalidated.115 Such a result would be more practical
for purposes of regulating unfairness in standard form contracts. As discussed earlier,
declining enforcement only to an individual term is the modus operandi of controls elsewhere
of fairness in standard form contracts.116 That includes the American doctrine of
unconscionability, which is not part of the doctrinal family to which the Canadian doctrine
belongs, but rather gives effect to Uniform Commercial Code §2-302.117 Invalidating an
individual term is not a normal mode of operation for unconscionability doctrines of the
family descended from the English doctrine of unconscionable bargains, including the
Canadian doctrine.118 As well, the basis of the doctrine’s effect is that it establishes a vice in
the weaker party’s consent, needed in order to form the contract. The consent was thus
defective, affecting the validity of the agreement as a whole.119
The explanation given by the Supreme Court for invalidating only one term in Uber is
actually consistent with the normal whole-agreement mode of operation of the doctrine. The
judgment explains that the arbitration clause “constitutes a self-contained contract collateral
or ancillary to the [main] agreement.”120 That explanation reconciles the unusual invalidation
of just the term in that case with the doctrine’s normal operation of invalidating agreements
as a whole. That the invalidation of just the arbitration clause was framed as an instance of,
rather than an exception to, the doctrine’s established modus operandi of avoiding whole
agreements reinforces that this is recognized as the doctrine’s effect. Further, it is important
to bear in mind that the issue here is not simply a matter of choosing between remedies of
broader or narrower scope. Because the authority of the doctrine to place in question the
validity of an agreement is that there was a defect in its formation, it follows that the whole
agreement is affected.121 The explanation for invalidating only the arbitration clause in Uber
reflects this, and there would have been no need for the Supreme Court to construct the term
as a collateral contract if that was not the case.
While the doctrine normally should and does operate, then, to unwind transactions as a
whole, there is no similar indication that under the revised doctrine the substantive unfairness
that is the basis of the claim of unconscionability must ordinarily extend beyond a particular
term. For example, the majority states that standard form “choice of law, forum selection,
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and arbitration clauses … violate the adhering party’s reasonable expectations by depriving
them of remedies. This is precisely the kind of situation in which the unconscionability
doctrine is meant to apply.”122 Justice Brown reads the majority opinion as holding even
more broadly that “[i]nstead of examining the entire bargain, my colleagues assert that
unconscionability can be alleged against specific provisions of a contract, rather than the
contract as a whole.”123 One would expect that if the complaint is about a particular term, and
the court evaluates the unconscionability only of that term, then only that term would be in
jeopardy, and it would be clear that the rest of the contract remains in force. This, as
mentioned, is how regimes of fairness control for standard form contracting operate.124
However, Justices Abella and Rowe in Uber are distinctly unclear on this. Notably, they hold
that “a finding of unconscionability can be directed at a contract as a whole or against any
severable provisions of it.”125 This stance is presumably an attempt to emulate the apparent
flexibility of the American doctrine of unconscionability, which Justices Abella and Rowe
commend as more “modern.”126 The provision on which the American doctrine is based
states, similarly:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable
at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
127

contract without the unconscionable clause.

In practice, however, this was found not to provide useful flexibility, but problematic
uncertainty. Thus, Farnsworth explains that as the American doctrine is distinct from
unconscionability doctrines elsewhere in its prime motivation being to control unfair terms
(elsewhere a task fulfilled by legislation),128 “courts have usually confined their attention to
unconscionable clauses themselves” without imperilling the whole contract.129 There is no
acknowledgment by the majority in Uber that it is aware of this practice, much less does it
include a reassurance of agreement with it. On the contrary, and concerningly, Justices
Abella and Rowe seem to see the issue of fairness in standard form contracting as
undifferentiated from exploitive bargains, and both as issues of valid formation: “Our point
is simply that unconscionability has a meaningful role to play in examining the conditions
behind consent to contracts of adhesion, as it does with any contract.”130 Conceiving of an
unfair term as an issue of consent, which goes to formation of the contract, and assimilating
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unfair terms to unconscionable bargains, where the normal result is rescission, both reinforce
concern that a single term found to be unconscionable is grounds for rescission.
If it does suffice for a finding of unconscionability that one standard form term within a
contract is unfair, this will further multiply the new exposure of standard form contracts to
rescission for unconscionability: to avert this, every term in the contract would have to stay
onside the low threshold of unfairness discussed earlier. This is significant, as standard form
contracts tend to contain lengthy sets of terms, and it is widely seen as being the case in
standard form contracting that it is typically only a particular term that is unfair, while the
contract as a whole is fair.131 Thus, given the stipulation that a lone unfair term now suffices
for a finding of unconscionability, many more contracts will fall offside of the doctrine and
be at risk of avoidance. The difficulty of complying term-by-term with a low and
unpredictable standard of unfairness collaterally increases the spectre of disruptions to
broader economic planning around standard form contracts, noted earlier. Considering the
inherent unpredictability of assessing unfairness at the level of a low standard, a firm hoping
to ensure the stability of its standard form would have to err on the side of drafting contra
se every term in which it and form-recipients have opposing interests. The detrimental impact
of this on its business would thus be felt not only contract-by-contract over mass use of the
standard form on the scale of its market, but also term-by-term through the form itself. In
short, the drafter’s difficult predicament will be compounded by the additional alteration of
the doctrine noted here.
All in all, the discussion in this part points to the reconstruction of the doctrine of
unconscionability without a knowledge requirement along with the associated other changes
surveyed above as presenting special difficulties for standard form contracting. And those
difficulties are significant. An expansive and unpredictable doctrine of unconscionability
threatens the large-scale ordering that standard form contracts are designed to, and do,
effectuate.132 From the parties’ perspectives, firms are caught between the risk of their
standard form being voidable en masse for unconscionability, or the risk of drafting a form
that is legally safe but unfavourable for business. If this predicament results in barriers to use
of standard forms, this will not help the parties who are currently form-recipients: they share
in the efficiency-savings of standard form contracts;133 and in contemporary society “[l]ife
would become almost impossible, if we had to ponder and inspect the risks every time we
made a contract.”134 Hence, the reimagined doctrine of unconscionability’s indiscriminate
approach to policing contractual unfairness could, paradoxically, be socio-economically
regressive by imposing crushing informational transaction costs on the parties whose
vulnerability it seeks to protect.135 This will happen if the doctrine’s reformulation results in
practice in these parties having to inform themselves of the terms and prove to the drafting
firm that they have done so, or else have to obtain their exchange needs elsewhere through
a classic negotiation process, at greatly added cost and trouble. As courts have realized since
the industrial revolution, standard form contracts, despite their well-known flaws, are a
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socio-legal institution integral to the modern economy. The special difficulties that the new
doctrine creates for their use could therefore cause significant economic disruption.
V. THEORETICAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE
DOCTRINE AND FOR THE LAW OF CONTRACT
Discussed in Part IV was the practical significance for the law and for the market of the
new incarnation of unconscionability. I now turn to the theoretical significance of this new
conception of the doctrine, without a knowledge requirement, and with the associated other
changes surveyed earlier. Part V.A below addresses the theoretical question of what idea the
newly reimagined doctrine embodies, if without a knowledge requirement it should no longer
be seen as about exploitation. Part V.B then considers the theoretical significance of this new
basis for transactional relief in the context of broader ideas about the nature of contractual
relations.
A.

UNCONSCIONABILITY AS RELIEF FROM
IMPROVIDENCE RATHER THAN EXPLOITATION

Theoretically, the significance of the knowledge requirement did not lie in the knowledge
itself. Rather, it was in constituting the minimum conduct seen as wrongful in the face of the
counterpart’s disability.136 This was crucial, given the theoretical conception of the traditional
doctrine and its surviving siblings elsewhere as being about relieving exploitation.137 As
“unconscionability” referred to an unconscientious abuse of power, it was necessary to be
able to say that the strong party did not act conscientiously in respect of its counterpart’s
impairment.138 If the stronger party had actual knowledge of the impairment, it did not act
conscientiously in wrongfully disregarding this knowledge in the making of the contract. If
it had only constructive knowledge, it still did not act conscientiously in wrongfully failing
to take the steps it was reasonably expected to take which would have made it aware of the
impairment (and hence the need to have regard to it). Fixed with or having that knowledge,
the stronger party wrongfully proceeded nonetheless in concluding a contract
disadvantageous to the impaired party.
The elimination of the doctrine’s knowledge requirement, combined with the associated
other alterations discussed earlier, yield a reconstructed doctrine that must fundamentally rest
on a different idea in offering a disadvantaged party relief from a contract it has made. In that
regard, it holds great significance. As the doctrine can apply whether or not the benefiting
party knew or should have known of its counterpart’s impairment, it cannot be about
improperly taking advantage of such an impairment. It is oxymoronic to speak of
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“inadvertent exploitation.”139 The reconceived doctrine is unconcerned with whether the
benefiting party engaged in wrongdoing.140
A requirement of “procedural unconscionability” was retained as an element of the revised
doctrine. However, as noted earlier, it is inapparent in what sense the benefiting party’s
procedural conduct could be described as “unconscionable” without that party having reason
to know there was a procedural issue on account of which it should have acted differently.
The word “unconscionability” in the requirement of procedural unconscionability is now
nothing more than a reference to the name of the doctrine itself. Arguably, the term
procedural unconscionability is still useful in distinguishing that element of the doctrine from
its other element of substantive unconscionability. Procedural unconscionability requires
either inequality of bargaining power or standard form contracting with a form-recipient
ignorant of the terms; substantive unconscionability requires that the agreement was
improvident for the complainant. The word “procedural” in procedural unconscionability
properly denotes the former condition relating to the circumstances in which the contract was
made as distinct from substantive unconscionability which is concerned with the exchange
itself. However, as mentioned, without a knowledge requirement, the “unconscionable”
aspect of procedural unconscionability lacks its traditional deeper meaning of conduct by the
defendant that was unconscientious, wrongful, or exploitative in taking advantage of the
counterpart’s disability. The change is therefore fundamental.
The reimagined doctrine is concerned instead only with the situation of the disadvantaged
party.141 It offers relief to a party that made an improvident bargain while in an asymmetric
position vis-à-vis the benefiting party. In negotiated contracting, the asymmetry is in power;
in standard form contracting, it is in information. The singular focus on the position of the
disadvantaged party gives the reinvented doctrine a distinct one-sided character. The onesidedness of the new doctrine is both novel and notable.
It is true that the traditional doctrine and its siblings had been the subject of debate as to
whether they were “defendant-sided” (focused on the benefiting party’s wrongdoing) or
“plaintiff-sided” (focused on the other party’s disadvantage).142 However, that debate was
about the relative emphasis of these elements within the doctrine. As discussed earlier, the
conventional view was that besides one party’s disability, there was at least a knowledge
requirement of it by the other party.143 Thus, while the doctrine did not require that a more
active form of exploitation had necessarily taken place, the knowledge requirement
represented a minimum level of wrongdoing by the stronger party that justified upsetting its
reliance on the validity of the contract.144 It failed to act conscientiously, given the
circumstances of its contracting partner’s impairment.145 The Supreme Court’s implication
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that it was simply endorsing the “plaintiff-sided” view in the debate about the doctrine’s
relative emphasis therefore was incorrect, as discussed earlier.146 In reality, the Supreme
Court was introducing a radical new theory of unconscionability willing to rescind a contract
without the benefiting party being blameworthy in any sense at all. This new doctrine finds
it appropriate to rescind a contract looking at the situation solely from the perspective of the
disadvantaged party — concerned simply to relieve that party of an improvident agreement
it made from an unequal position.147
Besides the novel one-sided character of the doctrine as reconceived, a second thing to
note is its principal preoccupation with the substantive unfairness of a contract. Traditionally,
the doctrine in Canada and its siblings elsewhere were in fact viewed as tilted towards
procedural concerns.148 This is reflected in the relatively narrow and exceptional
circumstances in which the doctrine applied. With the liberalization of the procedural
conditions of the doctrine’s application, it now applies in much wider circumstances. These
include, as noted earlier, routine procedural circumstances such as parties of unequal
bargaining power negotiating a contract or the party receiving a standard form contract being
unfamiliar with the terms. Most contracts are made in such procedural circumstances. For
all those contracts, in the absence of a knowledge requirement, unconscionability comes
down to the substantive fairness of the contract itself. Beneath its evocative name, and
despite the strict procedural requirements that characterized it traditionally and elsewhere,
the crux of the doctrine in Canada now is simply whether the contract is fair. If a court
concludes that it is not, it will be voidable for unconscionability.
The new substantive focus of the doctrine is greatly magnified by the associated change
discussed earlier of lowering the threshold of substantive unfairness necessary for a finding
of unconscionability. Previously and elsewhere, where a high degree of unfairness was
required, the substantive unfairness of the contract was less a question than a reason for one:
the unfairness was so blatant, it “call[ed] for explanation,”149 leading to scrutiny of the
procedural circumstances that normally is not called for.150 However, under the new
doctrine’s low threshold of unfairness simpliciter, substantive unconscionability is a question
that will be relevant for many contracts, and perhaps even individual terms. And because the
subjectivity of assessments of this makes for unpredictability, the risk is difficult for parties
to alleviate. Were there a knowledge requirement, some stability could be had by acting
conscientiously in the contracting process. But with the knowledge requirement discarded,
the substantive question will constantly loom overhead. The lowered threshold of unfairness
thus supports the concern of the new doctrine with allowing a disadvantaged party relief from
an improvident agreement.
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The discussion above explained how the doctrine as reconceived embodies a
fundamentally different idea of what provides a basis for relief from a contract than the
traditional doctrine and its siblings. Accordingly, it would help to be able to set it apart from
the traditional doctrine that we remember and its surviving relatives elsewhere. The name
“unconscionability” reflects the conventional doctrines’ concern with knowingly taking
advantage of a counterpart’s disability. It highlights the requirement of “exploitation” in that
sense. By contrast, since exploitation and indeed conscience play no role in the new doctrine,
as it eschews a knowledge requirement, it may be confusing or misleading to speak of it
being a doctrine of unconscionability. As discussed in this section, the new doctrine
distinguishes itself by its lack of concern for blameworthy conduct by the benefiting party,
minimal concern with procedural problems (as the doctrine’s procedural conditions are
satisfied in routine circumstances), but overriding aversion to holding a party that was weak
(even just in some ordinary way) responsible for an agreement it made that was substantively
improvident. With these as its distinguishing features, it could be seen as embodying the idea
of absolution: a doctrine of Contractual Absolution. As an unofficial label, this serves at least
to highlight its key contrasts from the traditional doctrine occupied with relieving
exploitation.
B.

THE DOCTRINE OF CONTRACTUAL ABSOLUTION

Within the grander picture of the law of contract, what ultimate significance does this
doctrine of Contractual Absolution have? In other words, what is the significance of the
revised doctrine allowing a party who made an improvident bargain, affected by merely
“ordinary” frailties, to be absolved of the consequences, independent of any wrongful
conduct by the other party in the making of the contract?
Although the Supreme Court has suggested that this is consistent with — and indeed gives
better effect, to contract theory than the traditional doctrine — its fit seems to me much more
uneasy.151 To a degree, the traditional doctrine of unconscionability fit uneasily with contract
theory. Enforcing promises, protecting reliance, and maintaining stability are key values that
help explain why the traditional doctrine was confined to a limited scope of application
through restrictive procedural and substantive conditions, discussed earlier. However, on
those conditions, the availability of the doctrine also protected key values, in its concern for
one party’s decisional autonomy being seriously constrained152 and the other party — where
the knowledge requirement was met — having exploited that.153 In these regards, the
traditional doctrine is seen as fitting with other established doctrines such as duress and
undue influence that embody similar concerns at that broad level.154 These, as noted, also
include a knowledge requirement.155 Without one, the new doctrine arguably falls in a
different category. As the previous section considered, it is not concerned with whether the
counterpart’s conduct was exploitive, or even with whether the disadvantaged party suffered
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from an unusual impairment. Its overriding preoccupation is with substantive disadvantage
residing in the contract itself. Looked at from various established points of view, the
existence of such a doctrine seems surprising, as it challenges some basic understandings
about contract law, going to the root of what a contract is and how it works.
As alluded to above, unlike the traditional doctrine, the new doctrine has a very expansive
scope of application, with contracts made in routine circumstances meeting its liberalized
procedural conditions. Also, the unpredictability of assessments of substantive unfairness
under the low threshold for this required under the new doctrine would realistically make it
difficult for a party to contract on terms that would be useful for business, yet safe from a
risk of being voidable as unconscionable. It was further argued that in most cases in which
the benefiting party lacked knowledge of its counterpart’s impairment, the weaker party itself
will have had at least constructive knowledge of its impairment. Besides being the most
common scenario, this one is also perhaps the most striking in terms of whether it is
reconcilable with conventional understandings of contracts. The discussion below therefore
focuses on this scenario.
One conventional view is that a contract creates mutual obligations between parties. It
could be argued that the doctrine of Contractual Absolution disrupts this basic understanding
of contracts. By virtue of it, only one of the parties is obliged; the other party effectively is
not, in that it can enter the contract, but later get itself absolved of its obligations. It can get
itself released from the obligations independent of any fault by the other party having
contributed to the making of those obligations. Thus, factoring in the new doctrine, a contract
would instead of mutual obligations effectively create on one side obligations but not rights,
and on the other side, rights but not obligations. This highlights how the one-sidedness of the
new doctrine more broadly affects contractual relations in a way that undermines the idea of
reciprocity often associated with contract law. In theory and in practice, the doctrine clashes
with reciprocity in contractual relations. In consumer law terms, one might see the doctrine
of Contractual Absolution as effectively providing the consumer, or weaker party of another
type, a kind of eternal “cooling off period” during which it can cancel the contract even if
there had been no exploitation by the other party.156
Another conventional understanding of contracts is that they consist of an exchange of
binding promises between parties. The doctrine of Contractual Absolution seems to challenge
this basic conceptualization of contracts too. Accounting for the impact of the new doctrine,
only one party is bound to its promises; the other party makes promises, but is effectively not
bound to them, as it can get itself relieved of them through the doctrine. It can be released
from its promises even if it was not in any way induced into making them by wrongful
conduct by the other party. Relatedly, the intent to be legally bound is a conventional way
of describing one of the conditions of the valid formation of a contract. However, given the
doctrine of Contractual Absolution, a party aware of its status as the weaker party under the
doctrine can intend to enter a contract, but not intend to be legally bound in that if it wishes
it could later seek to be released from its promises through the new doctrine. Rather than
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speak of intent to be legally bound, one could use the alternate conventional phrasing of an
intent to create legal relations. But this phrase would be stripped of much of its meaning in
that it would no longer implicitly suggest the nature of those legal relations, captured by the
phrasing that invokes binding promises. Under the new doctrine of Contractual Absolution,
a weaker party aware of its status could intend to decide at some future point — after the
contract is already in force — whether to legally bind itself to the promises it initially made.
Legally, there might actually be no fixed point at which the party must form that intent;
presumably, it could continue indefinitely to intend to decide later. It could wait until the
contract is fully performed,157 at which point it no longer contains future promises. Even
then, the party could possibly still get the transaction rescinded.
Another conventional understanding of contracts sees them as protecting the reasonable
expectations of a party based on the legal commitments it has exchanged.158 This idea is not
reflected in an obvious way in the doctrine of Contractual Absolution. The party not under
the disability but also not expected to know of it reasonably expects that the contract is valid
and that the specific commitments it received will be protected by law either through
performance or equivalence. But these expectations will be disappointed by the new doctrine,
which absolves the counterpart from having to fulfill its primary commitments and from a
secondary requirement to compensate the party for not performing the primary commitments.
In allowing the counterpart to back out of its commitments, the new doctrine is unconcerned
with whether the reliant party’s expectation that those commitments would be honoured
specifically or by equivalence was reasonable in that the commitments were not affected by
any wrongful action on its own part. The doctrine’s lack of concern for making good the loss
of expectancy suffered by the party that reasonably relied on the contract’s validity also
demonstrates how the doctrine of Contractual Absolution does not fit easily with
commutative justice perspectives on contracts. The benefiting party committed no wrong that
must be corrected.159 Arguably, the doctrine is not based on a theory of justice at all, but on
mercy.
Finally, one last conventional account of contracts is that they allocate or effectuate a
compromise of risks between parties.160 The doctrine of Contractual Absolution fits uneasily
with this account as well. As a result of the new doctrine, only one party assumes risks; the
other party does not, in the sense that if things go well, the party will retain the contract, but
if things do not go well, they can get out using the new doctrine. From that standpoint, the
doctrine enables this party to engage in risk-free contracting. The party enjoys the contract’s
opportunities, but is not burdened with its risks in that it can get the contract rescinded even
though the risks it seemed to have assumed were not the result of any exploitation by the
other party. In financial terms, one might see the doctrine of Contractual Absolution as
providing the party a kind of unilateral option that the party can act on without having to
exercise and thus commit itself to a course of action that it cannot later reverse by invoking
the new doctrine.
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As the uneasy fit with these various conventional understandings of contracts show, the
doctrine of Contractual Absolution is a remarkable development from the standpoint of our
existing law of contract.
VI. CONCLUSION
As this article has shown, the omission of a knowledge requirement from the reimagined
doctrine of unconscionability in Canada is a feature of considerable significance. That it
departs from the traditional Canadian position and ongoing position of sister doctrines
elsewhere in the Commonwealth is only the beginning of appreciating its full significance.
The inclusion of a knowledge requirement in the traditional doctrine and its siblings was
crucial in their giving effect to the idea that the doctrine serves to relieve exploitation.
Knowledge, actual or constructive, represented a minimum level of conduct that could be
considered wrongful, in the sense of knowingly taking advantage of a contracting partner’s
impairment in the making of a contract. With the knowledge requirement excised, the
doctrine can apply without any misconduct by the defendant of the unconscionability claim.
Unsurprisingly, this produces results that from a conventional perspective seem unjust.
Moreover, the absence of a knowledge requirement in the reinvented doctrine of
unconscionability carries practical and theoretical significance worthy of scholarly reflection.
Its practical significance is especially apparent in the context of the associated other changes
made concurrently with it, which expand the scope of application of the doctrine as a
measure which could counter inequalities produced by freedom of contract. Taken together,
their vast expansion of the doctrine’s scope of application make the new doctrine —
including its omission of a knowledge requirement — of increased significance. Many
contracts across a wide range of contexts, including routine instances of standard form
contracting, are subject to the new doctrine and its capacity to avoid contracts without the
defendant of the claim having had knowledge of any defect in the making of the contract.
Various associated changes also interact with the elimination of the knowledge requirement
in specific ways of additional significance. Notably, these include liberalization of the
procedural circumstances serving as conditions of the doctrine’s application, and
intensification of the new doctrine’s scrutiny of the substantive fairness of contracts.
Emerging from the reflection in this article is a reconceived doctrine that no longer gives
effect to the idea of relieving exploitation, as did the traditional doctrine of unconscionability
and its siblings elsewhere. Rather, the new doctrine is characterized by a one-sided focus on
the position of the disadvantaged party. And further, as suggested, its principal concern in
respect of that party is harshness if courts enforce the substantive disadvantage.161 The
doctrine serves to relieve the disadvantaged party from a substantively improvident bargain.
It may therefore be argued that the reinvented doctrine no longer embodies an idea
intelligible as unconscionability. Rather, it offers absolution to a party disadvantaged by an
improvident contract. The new doctrine of Contractual Absolution is a remarkable
development in the common law, and one which poses a challenge to conventionally-held
fundamental understandings of the nature and effect of contracts.
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